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Abstract
This essay is drawn from a book manuscript that examines Ralph Ellison’s life-long preoc-
cupation with time and concomitant pursuit of a literature of immanence. In it, I illustrate how
Ellison’s engagements with Bergsonian philosophy, Nietzschean cosmology, cybernetic theory,
and transhistorical inquiry are inseparable from his ongoing efforts to trouble the Newtonian con-
struct of universal time. Whether it’s in his early short stories, his 1952 masterpiece Invisible Man,
his music criticism, or his unfinished tome posthumously published as Three Days Before the
Shooting. . . , Ellison routinely turns to optic and sonic technologies to enact performative critiques
of a still-hegemonic view of temporality born of the Enlightenment and maintained by the forces
of capitalist acceleration and globalization. As he interrogates the forms of subjectivity that spa-
tialized time reifies, Ellison constructs an alternative durational framework in which individuality
and democracy, like emergent temporalities, are always becoming, immanent and inter-implicated.
Ellison’s remedies for the order progressive history imposes upon the present, I contend, directly
address the time that history adulterates by reclaiming the very technologies through which lin-
ear time is formalized. As an integral part of this larger work, “Rhopographic Photography and
Atemporal Cinema” specifically addresses Ellison’s Bergsonian ekphrastic references to still pho-
tography and motion picture projection in his ultimately unfinished second novel and illustrates
how Ellison’s own evolving photographic compositions, represented by the Polaroid photographs
he took between 1966 and 1994, inform his temporal theorizing.
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Rhopographic Photography and Atemporal 
Cinema: The Link Between Ralph Ellison’s 
Polaroids and Three Days Before the Shooting… 
Michael Germana 
“Here in this country it’s change the reel and change the man.” 
—Senator Adam Sunraider in Three Days Before the Shooting… 
“A paradox: the same century invented History and 
Photography.” 
—Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida 
When Ralph Ellison passed away in 1994 at the age of eighty, he left behind a 
treasure trove of published writing that includes numerous short stories and book 
reviews, more than two volumes of essays of literary and cultural criticism, and his 
masterpiece Invisible Man, which won the National Book Award in 1953. He also 
left behind two archives—and two enigmas—that are the subjects of this essay. The 
first is the sprawling manuscript of an unfinished second novel upon which Ellison 
labored for forty years that was carefully pieced together by John F. Callahan and 
Adam Bradley and published in 2010 as Three Days Before the Shooting…. The 
other is a collection of hundreds of Polaroid photographs taken by Ellison over the 
last thirty years of his life, the subjects of which consist almost entirely of objects 
instead of people. 
When viewed in relation rather than in isolation, these two archives become less 
enigmatic. Instead, they appear as homologous components of Ellison’s lifelong 
exploration of visual technologies of mechanical reproduction and the role these 
technologies play in reducing temporalities to form. That a tight connection exists 
between Ellison’s photography and his fiction writing was first fully realized by Sara 
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Blair, who convincingly demonstrates how the historical critique of Invisible Man is 
informed by, if not rehearsed in, Ellison’s early street photography. In this essay, I 
extend Blair’s argument by examining Ellison’s later photography alongside his 
post-Invisible Man fiction. In the process, I illustrate how Ellison spent the last 
decades of his life using pen and camera together to trouble the temporal construct of 
static time that subtends progressive, linear histories—histories that underwrite the 
racial cartographies Ellison so lucidly critiqued in Invisible Man. 
To understand both the importance of Ellison’s Polaroids and the ekphrastic 
logic of Three Days, Ellison’s “instant” photographs need to be viewed as antidotes 
to the ways of seeing formalized by the sequential photographic apparatuses that 
organ-ize the identities of two of the novel’s principal characters. In Three Days, 
Ellison juxtaposes the first-person narratives of two white subjects who internalize 
the form(s) of mechanical visual reproduction associated with his current and/or 
former profession. Book I of the novel is told from the point of view of a journalist 
and self-proclaimed liberal named Welborn McIntyre who unconsciously objectifies 
and thereby “mortifies” African Americans with a photographic gaze reflexively 
doubled by the still images that surround him. Book II, in turn, is partially told from 
the perspective of a U.S. Senator named Adam Sunraider whose atemporal filmic 
creations, traces of his younger days as a cinematographer, erupt into and overwrite 
his own disjointed personal history. These characters’ modes of seeing and the 
technologies through which they are formalized represent two different, but equally 
problematic relationships to the past and, by extension, U.S. racial history.  
Crucially, each character’s way of seeing is simulated ekphrastically in the 
respective books that constitute Ellison’s novel. McIntyre views history as a linear 
progression, a view Ellison explicitly likens to a work of narrative cinema and, more 
pointedly, the sequential still images of which motion pictures are comprised. 
Because of McIntyre’s unconscious racism and concomitant impulse to view black 
subjects as “object[s] of historical knowledge” (Gualtieri 155), his cinematic 
narrative is populated with still shots and freeze frames of African Americans. 
McIntyre’s photographic gaze therefore photogrammatically reproduces the 
imaginary static material of which progressive history is made. Unable or unwilling 
to recognize the return of the repressed photograms in the temporal/cinematic 
illusion of his vision of history, McIntyre persists in his evasion by relegating black 
people to the expository margins of his narrative and relying upon his tape recorder, 
another form of mechanical reproduction, to reconstruct the stories of persons of 
color like Lee Willie Minifies who resist and subvert his mortifying gaze. 
While McIntyre tries to deny the blackness within the illuminated frames of an 
historical narrative in which he has blind(ing) faith, Senator Sunraider suppresses the 
blackness that frames his personal history in an attempt to escape the trauma of his 
imaginary loss of whiteness—a loss that followed rather than accompanied his entry 
into black subjectivity. I refer here to the moment in the novel when the Senator, 
recalling his youth from his hospital bed, reflects upon his days as Bliss, a boy raised 
by black parishioners to become preacher in the church. At more than one point 
during this recollection he remembers being “claimed” by a white woman who 
crashes a Juneteenth camp meeting and declares the young Bliss to be her son. The 
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would-be Senator’s subsequent attempts to escape the blackness of his past and 
“project” a whiteness, for which his role in U.S. legislative history was at the time a 
precondition, take the form of cinematic creations both literal and figurative within 
the novel. As a young man and prodigal foster son, the future Congressman steps 
away from his life as a boy preacher in the black church and becomes a filmmaker 
who, while passing for white, attempts to “master” time through cinematography 
(279). The disjointed filmic creations of his youth are ekphrastically quoted within 
Sunraider’s cinematic recollections of the past, further warping and distorting the 
diegetic temporal frame of his narrative. 
Still images also appear within Sunraider’s cinematic memories, but unlike 
McIntyre’s explicitly racist photographic caesurae, the pauses in the Senator’s 
recollection oscillate between two interdependent forms of composition described by 
Norman Bryson: rhopography, which depicts “those things which lack importance, 
the unassuming material base of life that ‘importance’ constantly overlooks,” and 
megalography, “the depiction of those things in the world which are great—the 
legends of the gods, the battles of heroes, the crises of history” (61).1 As the boy 
named Bliss becomes the man named Adam Sunraider, the rhopographic still-life 
images associated with his recollected youth give way to megalographic still shots 
and freeze frames of his approaching assassination. The connective tissue between 
these two modes of seeing, as well as the two identities whose priorities they 
articulate, is the future-Senator’s role as “Mr. Movie-man,” a filmmaker who turns 
black subjects into “ghosts.” 
Ellison’s historical-temporal critique in Three Days hinges upon the constitutive 
relationship between still photography and cinematic projection, or between the 
projected apparition and the photograms of which motion pictures are comprised. 
Throughout the novel, Ellison refers to the simulation of duration created when 
sequential still images are passed through a motion picture projector as an extended 
metaphor for progressive history and the static temporality upon which it depends. In 
the process, he illustrates how historical time so formalized stands in opposition to 
Henri Bergson’s concept of a genuine duration. 
Ellison read widely on the subject of time, and many of Ellison’s sources have 
been thoroughly examined by scholars. However, the influence of Henri Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution (1911) has yet to be fully appreciated. Integral to both Creative 
Evolution and Ellison’s explorations of temporality is Bergson’s concept of duration 
or dynamic time, which Bergson juxtaposes against the Newtonian construct of 
static, spatialized time. According to Bergson, a life is not a linear progression or 
series of transitions from one state of being to the next; rather, a life (indeed, life 
itself) is a durational whole that qualitatively unfolds in an incessant and insistent 
process of becoming—a process characterized by “invention, the creation of forms, 
the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” (11). Time, in other words, isn’t a 
backdrop against which events take place, but is integral to and thus inseparable 
from the actualization of difference. Time, for Bergson, is difference, for becoming 
is the uncoiling of difference, the actualization in the present of something virtual 
from the past bound up in the present. Bergson’s prioritization of (dynamic) 
becoming over (static) being is radically anti-mechanistic, anti-teleological, and 
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entirely unlike the Newtonian framework embraced by the empirical sciences.  
Mediating our experience or understanding of the unbroken time of becoming is 
something Bergson dubbed “The Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought and the 
Mechanistic Illusion,” which he illustrates with an extended visual-mechanical 
metaphor essential to Ellison’s filmic conceit in Three Days: “Instead of attaching 
ourselves to the inner becoming of things,” laments Bergson, “we place ourselves 
outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as 
it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have 
only to string them on…to imitate…becoming itself.” This, observes Bergson, is 
how a complex, chaotic, and durational reality is transformed into a progressive 
linear sequence of static moments or images: through language and thought-forms 
that reify this mechanistic illusion. When we think about becoming in this way, he 
writes, “we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside 
us” (306).  
Bergsonian duration in general and this photographic/cinematographic 
metaphor in particular are integral to the three-fold critique of linear temporality, 
progressive history, and structural racism at the heart of Ellison’s unfinished novel—
a critique that hinges upon the ekphrastic references to photography and 
cinematography Ellison makes throughout the text. Ellison’s portrayal, in Three 
Days, of history as a process of qualitative unfolding, in which the past conditions 
the present but does not determine the future, is inseparable from Bergson’s critique 
of spatialized time as both realized in and reinforced by these visual technologies of 
mechanical reproduction. If Bergson emphasizes his point about static time with 
allusions to photography and cinematography, then Ellison simulates these visual 
forms in his novel to allude to Bergson as part of a broader assessment of 
progressive history and the temporal construct that subtends it.2  
In McIntyre and Sunraider, Ellison has crafted characters whose perceptions 
and actions are antithetical to the Bergsonian process of creative evolution and the 
durational temporality upon which such evolution depends. The Polaroid 
photographs Ellison made while working on Three Days, by contrast, articulate 
alternatives to spatialized time and thereby recover what Tamsin Lorraine, invoking 
Deleuze’s adoption of Bergson, calls the “dynamic tendencies implicit in the 
present” (99). While Three Days dramatizes how the visual logic of motion picture 
photography formalizes a “groove of history” within which African Americans are 
entombed, Ellison’s “ontographic” Polaroids give form to an alternative temporality 
consistent with what Ellison, after Bergson, privileges as “‘real’ or actual time or 
duration” (Invisible Man 443; “An Extravagance of Laughter” 621). 
Ellison’s embrace of the rhopographic composition in general and the still life 
in particular is indicative of his personal attempts to work through the same paradox 
that preoccupies his characters: how to use a visual technology that formalizes static 
time to reveal the dynamism of becoming and the durational nature of time. As 
Bryson notes, rhopography is “The enemy [of] a mode of seeing which thinks it 
knows in advance what is worth looking at and what is not.” Because rhophographic 
images recapture the surprise of seeing things for the first time, writes Bryson, 
“[s]ight is taken back to a vernal stage before it learned how to scotomise the visual 
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field, how to screen out the unimportant and not see, but scan” (65). In a sense, 
Bryson is characterizing rhopographic images as signifiers of subjectivity’s 
precondition and invitations to return to a Deleuze-Guattarian “plane of immanence” 
out of which actualized “planes of organization” emerge. Or, to quote Ellison’s 
protagonist in Invisible Man, rhopography can remind us of “the chaos which lives 
within the pattern of [our] certainties” (580-581).  
Ellison longed for a history that serves life and action. But what he confronted 
daily was an historical imaginary structured like a motion picture: sequential, linear, 
and deterministic. As Bergson knew, a historiography whose progress affirms 
destiny instead of possibility maintains the illusion of a mechanistic universe. 
Ellison’s Bergsonian “cinematographic” metaphor for progressive history is 
particularly apt because photography, cinematography, and linear historiography all 
formalize an atomized and spatialized view of time; as such, each is underwritten by, 
and in turn underwrites, the Newtonian construct of time as extended space, a 
container or “groove” in which a sequence of Kantian “nows” form an ever-
extending line.  
Like Bergson, commentators on photography and cinema have tied these media 
forms to a reductive view of history that subsumes its chaotic, non-linear, molecular 
dynamism. For example, Eduardo Cadava writes, “photography names a process 
that, seizing and tearing an image from its context, works to immobilize the flow of 
history” (xx). This quasi-Bergsonian observation about photography and history is 
inseparable from the well-rehearsed connection between photography and death. 
“Subjects of photography, seized by the camera, we are mortified,” continues 
Cadava—“that is, objectified, ‘thingified,’ imaged,” a situation that “allows us to 
speak of our death before our death” as “[t]he image already announces our absence” 
(8).3 Elena Gualtieri paraphrases the Kracauerian antecedent of this observation and 
unpacks its temporal implications when she writes that photography is “the 
technological realization of a certain conception of history,” which “rests on a linear 
model of temporality which marks the past off as a separate dimension, as the object 
of historical knowledge rather than as an integrated part of lived experience” (155).  
This deathly logic of photography and history extends to the cinema. As Garrett 
Stewart writes in Between Film and Screen: Modernism’s Photo Synthesis, 
“Whereas photography engraves the death it resembles, cinema defers the death 
whose escape it simulates. The isolated photo or photogram is the still work of death; 
cinema is death always still at work” (xi). Stewart’s principal argument in this book 
is that the repressed photogram which disappears in the projected cinematic 
apparition returns in the form of the still shot and the freeze frame—quotations of 
the sequential still images of which the motion picture is comprised. The return of 
the repressed still image within the projected apparition marks the return of a death 
that cannot be escaped, only deferred by way of a cinematic simulation of motion. 
Aside from foregrounding the moments in Three Days when cinematic memories 
temporarily revert to still(ed) images, this Bergsonian description of cinema as 
sequential photography whose projection enacts a simulation of duration is echoed 
by Ellison’s remark in “The Golden Age, Time Past”: “Ours is the tempo of the 
motion picture, not that of the still camera, and we waste experience as we wasted 
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the forest” (239; emphasis added). Suffice it to say that for Ellison, as well as 
Bergson, the difference between photography and cinema is a one of degree rather 
than kind: the death associated with each medium, characterized here by Ellison as 
“waste,” is inextricable from their roles as technologies that territorialize time and 
formalize linear models of history that depend upon time so figured. 
Ellison’s ekphrastic references to photography and cinematography in Three 
Days are central to his exploration of history vis à vis temporality, out of which 
emerges Ellison’s deeper (and downright Deleuzian) theorization of the connection 
between coercive racial and temporal constructs. In the novel, Ellison portrays 
structural racism and spatialized time as interdependent molarities standing in 
interaction. Rather than depict the effects of this interaction upon racialized subjects 
as deterministic, Ellison demonstrates how race can be destabilized by troubling the 
historico-temporal construct with which it is linked at a molecular level, or “on the 
lower frequencies” (Invisible Man 581).  
Prologue and Book I: Stills and Stiffs 
The text of Three Days begins, appropriately enough, with an example of what 
Garrett Stewart calls cinema’s “photo synthesis.” The Prologue gets underway with 
the arrival of Reverend Alonzo Hickman and his African American congregation in 
Washington, D.C. where they have come to warn Senator Sunraider of a plot to 
assassinate him, and concludes with the description of a photograph depicting the 
preacher and his parishioners praying at the Lincoln Memorial after being turned 
away by Sunraider’s handlers. This photograph, taken by an amateur high school 
photographer and “flashed over the wires following the shooting” (9), exemplifies a 
way of (not) seeing —an objectifying photographic gaze reproduced by photographs 
like this. Evidence of further reproduction and internalization of this gaze 
immediately follows as Senator Sunraider’s secretary, “a young Mississippian,” 
views Hickman as the subject of—or rather an object within—a photographic 
composition (6). As the omniscient narrator looking through the secretary’s eyes 
observes, Hickman is “framed by the doorway, as the others arranged themselves 
beyond him in the hall” after occluding the “large abstract paintings which hung 
along the paneled wall” of the Senator’s office (6). Hickman’s corporeal visibility, 
brought into bold relief against the original and unique (as opposed to mechanically 
reproduced) paintings behind him, is reduced within the secretary’s vision to an 
object in the foreground of a “framed” photographic composition consisting of 
“Southern Negroes of a type she had heard of all her life” (6). Immediately after 
photographically “thingifying” him and classifying him as a reproducible “type,” not 
unlike one of an infinite number of photographs that can be made from the same 
negative, the secretary denies that the Senator could know Hickman since “the only 
colored he knows is the boy who shines shoes at his golf club” (6). Ellison concludes 
the Prologue by drawing a connection between the secretary’s objectification of 
Hickman, who raised the boy who became the Senator, and the photographic gaze 
that enables it. This connection takes the form of an observation made by the high-
school student who snapped the picture of Hickman and his congregation, who 
observes “that he had seen them as a ‘good composition…. I thought their faces 
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would make a fine scale of grays between the whiteness of the marble and the 
blackness of the shadows’” (9). 
If the Prologue inheres in the photograph, Book I puts the still image into 
motion like a photogram dissolving into a projected motion picture via critical 
flicker fusion. This “photo synthetic” process turns reflexive in narrative cinema by 
way of the still shot and the freeze frame, which visually quote the still photographs 
of which motion pictures are made. Ellison simulates this self-reflexive cinematic 
gesture at the start of Book I when McIntyre, recalling the attempted assassination of 
Sunraider on the Senate floor by a black gunman, is struck by the seemingly 
inexplicable “photographic image of the elegant magnesium-bodied sports car which 
ignited and burned during the recent running of the Le Mans Grand Prix” that 
popped into his mind when the shooting started (13). I say seemingly inexplicable 
because this “photographic image” is in fact McIntyre’s repressed memory of Lee 
Willie Minifees setting fire to his Cadillac on Sunraider’s lawn, a scene described 
later in the novel via flashback and which I examine below. Immediately after 
recalling his recollection of this image McIntyre notes, “Then things seemed to reel 
out of phase” (13). The word “reel” here, as well as the symbolism of a sequence of 
“shots” raining down from the balcony onto the stage below, evokes the technology 
of motion picture projection. Because McIntyre unconsciously views history as both 
a narrative of progress and a motion picture, he associates the assassination attempt 
on the Senator with a mechanical glitch that interrupts the illusion of seamless 
cinematic motion. Rather than totally disintegrate into photograms and thereby give 
the lie to his illusory view of history, however, McIntyre keeps the movie playing in 
his mind by having the stilled image dissolve once more into cinematic motion. The 
photographic image—in this case the repressed memory of Minifees’s burning 
Cadillac—is subordinated once more to a cinematic simulation of death’s deferral 
after becoming temporarily insistent in McIntyre’s recollection of the event.4  
The dialectic Stewart describes between photography or the photographic gaze 
and cinema continues in the aforementioned “Cadillac Flambé” episode, which 
begins with McIntyre expecting a photographic shoot but getting instead a “tableau 
vivant,” which he characterizes as “the most unexpected picture of the year,” leaving 
him “wish[ing] for a cinema camera to synchronize with my recorder!” (39). Here, 
McIntyre associates Minifees, a black man who has parked his Cadillac on 
Sunraider’s lawn in preparation for a ritualistic sacrifice-by-fire, with still images 
(photographs, tableaux, etc.), and he wishes (or says he wishes) he had another form 
of mechanical reproduction to accompany his tape recorder. However, as his 
displaced memory of the image of the burning Grand Prix racecar illustrates, 
McIntyre’s modus operandi is to deny African Americans agency by denying them 
even the simulated motion that the cine camera would provide. Minifees’s voice 
comes through loud and clear on “different wavelengths” thanks to McIntyre’s tape 
recorder (48), but his actions become frozen into a still shot within McIntyre’s 
memory: “in the foreground at the bottom of the slope,” he recalls, 
a rough semicircle of outraged faces; in the midforeground, up the gentle 
rise of the lawn, the white convertible shooting into the springtime air a 
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radiance of intense blue flame, like that of a welder’s torch or a huge fowl 
being flambéed in choice cognac; then on the rise above, distorted by heat 
and flame, the dark-skinned, white-suited driver: standing with his 
gleaming face expressive of high excitement as he watched the effect of his 
deed. (39)  
Minifees’s actions traumatize McIntyre, who relegates the jazzman to the lower, 
sonic frequencies of his narrative and the frozen realm of the photogram. And while 
this memory may symbolically return as the image of the burning racecar that irrupts 
into his cinematic memory of the assassination attempt on Senator Sunraider, 
McIntyre himself never makes this connection between the stilled image of Minifees 
and the simulated deferral of Sunraider’s death.  
McIntyre’s “stills,” which arrest the narrative as much as they arrest motion, go 
hand in hand with his saturation of Book I with exposition, which inhibits the 
progress of the narrative that contains him. Take, for example, the entirety of Chapter 
8, which consists almost entirely of expository recollections, except for a single 
question McIntyre fails to ask Hickman and Hickman answers anyway with comic 
subversion. At first, this stilling – or stilting – of the narrative and its temporal 
progression seems curious. After all, Ellison’s revisions to Invisible Man revolved 
around maintaining narrative inertia and his own reading on time and narrative 
specifically cites expository reflections like McIntyre’s as ineffective. Why, on the 
heels of Invisible Man’s success and in light of these observations, would Ellison 
develop a character and a plot line that so completely contradicts the conventions 
governing the effective use of time and narrative in Book I? The answer is that 
McIntyre’s failures as a narrator—echoed later in the novel by his admitted failures 
as a novelist—are the subject, not a shortcoming, of Book I. That is, McIntyre’s 
time-arresting narrative indirectly critiques the gaze that entombs black persons 
within a coercive historico-temporal construct, the progress of which is enacted 
through the stasis of minoritarian subjects. Unconsciously, McIntyre associates 
blackness with stasis and, at the same time, imagines history as a progressive line 
that, like time, is followed rather than made—a channel in which events and persons 
either take place or plunge from its groove. 
Integral to this critique is the fact that McIntyre sees history, be it personal or 
national, as a form of narrative cinema. Just as the projected image turns back on 
itself through the still shot and the freeze frame, so too does McIntyre’s reverie self-
reflexively disintegrate into sequential still images. The yarn McIntyre weaves about 
his youthful love affair with a black woman named Laura Johnson whom he 
impregnated and planned to marry, if but to prove his liberality to himself, best 
illustrates this interplay between cinematic memory and photographic vision. 
Beginning, “I tried to shake it, but a stream of images now pursued me like the scene 
from a movie which I had seen as a child” (79), McIntyre’s recollection of his 
personal past is explicitly likened to a motion picture. Within this cinematic 
narrative, McIntyre’s memory of going to Laura’s parents’ apartment to “do the 
honorable thing” is populated with still photographic images, both real and 
imagined. Laura’s mother, for example, is “[a] short, large-breasted, matronly dark 
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woman whom I’d seen only in photographs” (104), and when confronted with the 
task of speaking to Laura’s mother, McIntyre fixates instead on “the opposite wall” 
where “an upright piano stood with a row of framed photographs arranged on top, 
one of them of Laura in white cap and gown, flanked by her smiling parents” (105). 
An ironic inversion of Barthes’s experience of “finding” his deceased mother in a 
stack of old photographs in Camera Lucida, this scene dramatizes McIntyre’s 
confrontation with the living black mother he secretly wishes he could lose. Because 
he is uncomfortable with the presence of Laura’s mother, McIntyre fixates on 
photographs of her and/or likens her to a photograph in a failed attempt to imagine 
her absence. He is eventually relieved of the dilemma her presence poses by the 
woman herself, who returns with shotgun in hand to hasten McIntyre’s departure. 
When she tells McIntyre, “All your troubles with your black woman are over!” she 
might as well be describing his aborted relationship to herself instead of his 
terminated affair with her pregnant daughter.5 
This extended memory of McIntyre’s is also exemplary of Garrett Stewart’s 
observations about still shots in narrative cinema. McIntyre views his own past as a 
movie, but the repressed photograms upon which this simulated motion depends 
return in these memories in the form of photographs, including the linear sequence 
that sits atop the piano of the Johnson family parlor. Just as the sequential 
photograms of the film strip shimmer to the surface of the projected cinematic 
illusion by way of the freeze frame and the still shot, so too do black subjects return 
as photographic objects within a narrative of illusory progress comprised of the very 
still photographs it suppresses via simulated motion. Perhaps this is why, within this 
cinematic memory, McIntyre remembers walking past a movie marquee announcing 
a film called “The Lost World Returns” (115). What is “returning” here is 
McIntyre’s unconscious association between his perception of personal progress and 
his escape from blackness. Just like the cinema in which motion is simulated by 
synthesizing sequential photograms that return as still visual quotations, so too does 
McIntyre’s memory of a past he feels he has transcended return in the form of 
sequential photographs. If the “motion” of the motion picture relies on the stasis of 
the photograms that comprise the film strip, then McIntyre’s sense of “progress” 
relies on the perceived stasis of African Americans. He, in turn, imagines himself as 
the white subject of a whitewashed narrative of progress that Ellison likens to a 
movie. 
The dialectical relationship between photographic caesurae and cinematic 
projection examined here returns to the forefront when McIntyre accompanies the 
police to Jessie Rockmore’s house. Part museum, part mansion, Rockmore’s 
brightly lit parlor becomes the staging ground for McIntyre’s reanimation of still 
images from the distant past—a heap of broken images right out of Eliot’s “The 
Wasteland” that Rockmore, a long-time salvage man and entrepreneur, shored up 
against his ruins. McIntyre recollects the event as part mise en scene, part silent film. 
“My eyes become partially adjusted to the blaze of light,” he remembers, “and the 
wall before me seems to flicker like an early silent movie, its brightly colored 
lithographs creating a feeling of vertigo in which I fall back into a swirl of images of 
earlier times athrob somehow with the pain of neglected memory” (142). These 
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images, which spring into motion unexpectedly in McIntyre’s mind, ought to remind 
the reporter of his own neglected memories, for they expose the “photo synthetic” 
logic of his own repressed past. Only here, still images of African-, Anglo-, and 
Native American historical figures are transformed into photograms that dissolve 
into McIntyre’s “movie” of history—an unexpected and unsettling experience for 
McIntyre, who is confronted with the virtual past caught up in the actual present. In 
short, if his recollection of his personal history relies upon the stilling of non-white 
Americans in an attempt to entomb them in the past and thereby signify his 
movement into the future, his reanimation of these historical figures brings the stilled 
past back into motion to reveal the nonlinear, durational nature of temporality as well 
as the fallacy of McIntyre’s differentially defined progress. “I was looking straight 
ahead with squinted eyes,” McIntyre recalls, “when suddenly President Lincoln’s 
funeral cortege sprang from the glaring wall before me. Flag-draped and crepe-
shrouded, it floated past with a creaking of camion and leather, the clink of chains. 
The lithographs had come sharply alive” (142). Besides images of Robert E. Lee and 
John Brown, which gallop and march by, respectively, pictures of black horse 
jockeys and a line of “dark” and “gaudily dressed couples strutting a cakewalk” run 
and walk across McIntyre’s mind’s eye (142-43). Then “Black Hawk and Tecumseh, 
Sitting Bull and Stumickosucks, Chief Joseph and Oceola, Crazy Horse and Little 
Hand” join President Harding and boxer Jack Johnson in the impromptu motionful 
projection (144-45). Eventually, McIntyre notes, “[o]bjects in the room seemed to 
flow, turning in a slow, tumbling motion of time” (146). No longer perceived by 
McIntyre as linear but “swirl[ing]” and “turning in a slow tumbling motion,” time 
turns back upon itself at Jessie Rockmore’s, giving the lie to his own feeble attempts 
to objectify and engrave African Americans as a bulwark against the ruins of his 
white liberal identity. Or should I say that the durational nature of time is revealed by 
the objects and images throbbing with vitality in Rockmore’s parlor. 
Book II: Atemporality and Rhopography 
Whereas Book I begins with a prolegomenous photograph that disappears into a 
synthesized cinematic apparition, Book II begins with a cinematic projection that 
threatens to “reel out of phase” and disintegrate into the sequential images that 
comprise it. Immediately prior to the attempt on his life, the Senator imagines 
himself as a cinematic apparition being projected before his audience. He recalls he 
image of the Great Seal apparently “hurtling down toward him with the transparent 
unsubstantiality of a cinematic image” as it “flashed and flickered,” his audience “in 
the tense attitude of viewers bemused by some puzzling action unfolding on a distant 
screen,” and their faces “shimmer[ing]” in the crowd (235, 236, 236, 237). Once the 
bullets start to fly, however, the ekphrastic references to motion picture projection 
give way to a montage of Sunraider’s experiences, including his stint as a filmmaker. 
It is implied but never stated that making movies was what made it possible for Bliss 
to become Sunraider, or for the young black preacher to become the white, race-
baiting Senator. Critical to my analysis is the way this opening montage exemplifies 
Garrett Stewart’s comments about “cinema defer[ring] the death whose escape it 
simulates” (xi). Sunraider seeks to defer the photogrammatic freeze frame that will 
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“engrave” his death. Thus he ceases to embody the projected image “reel[ing] out of 
phase,” and imagines himself a cine camera once the shooting begins, “his 
eyes…recording details of the wildly tossing scene with the impassive and precise 
inclusiveness of a motion-picture camera that was toppling slowly from its tripod” 
(13, 245). If he can “ROLL THE CAMERA!” as he recalls himself saying (247), then 
he can defer his own death (or simulate its deferral, anyway). 
There is a circular logic to Sunraider’s shift from cinematic projection to motion 
picture camera above. On the one hand, his life is flashing before his eyes in the 
form of a cinematic flashback. Within this flashback, he remembers “casting” his 
“teasing brown” girl (266)—the mother of his assassin, his son—as the subject of his 
cinematic gaze, and shooting films he likens to assassinations with his cohorts. What 
the reader witnesses, when it all comes full circle, is Sunraider’s production of 
himself—or image of himself—through the medium of motion pictures. He is 
chronicling in filmic fashion the manufacturing of the apparition he imagines 
himself to be when the shooting starts (and, of course, the shooting itself is likened 
to the projection of that image, only atomized into individual “shots” instead of a 
synthesized whole). Tying everything together is the fact that Sunraider is producing 
his own whiteness, another apparition that Ellison symbolically sutures to the 
cinema throughout Book II, just as he associates blackness with still photography in 
Book I. Book II even formally echoes Sunraider’s efforts in that, unlike Book I 
which is broken into discreet chapters, Book II is an unbroken but convoluted whole. 
The reader must rely upon contextual clues to determine what period of the subject’s 
life is being recalled at any given time: the boy Bliss, the young adult “Mr. Movie 
Man,” or the adult Senator Sunraider. Unlike McIntyre, who relies upon 
photographic caesurae in a failed attempt to preserve an historical narrative that is 
likened to a motion picture, Sunraider uses the cine camera itself, an extension of his 
atemporal vision, in an equally failed attempt to deny the imagined loss of an 
identity he can only maintain in illusory form—an illusion that depends upon his 
perpetual deferral of a hereditary blackness from which he can never escape. 
The megalographic image Sunraider constructs of himself, an image that 
mimics the language and imagery of motion picture projection in the opening 
sequence of Book II, is inextricable from two moments that, taken together, 
precipitate his tragic fate. The first of these moments is a picnic that he, while still a 
young man, shares with Lavatrice, a young African American woman whom he 
subsequently impregnates with his future assassin. The second moment occurs 
earlier in his life but is remembered later in the narrative. I refer specifically to the 
moment when, during a Juneteenth celebration camp meeting, young Bliss is pulled 
from a white coffin from which he is about to theatrically rise as the Holy Spirit by a 
white woman claiming to be his mother. Because the significance of the latter 
moment relies upon the symbolism of and atemporal structure initiated by the 
former, I will focus first upon Sunraider’s career as a filmmaker before returning to 
his early life as a preacher in the black church and his deferred entry into white 
subjectivity. 
In the first of these two moments, Ellison juxtaposes the megalographic image 
of Sunraider’s future with a rhopographic image from his past. In this scene, the 
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future Senator, referred to as “Mr. Movie-man” by Lavatrice, leaves his camera 
behind, experiences a “suspension of time” (267), and focuses on the minute details 
of the picnic she has prepared for him as though it were a still life: “I sat, watching 
with my chin resting upon my knees as her hands came and went, removing 
sandwiches wrapped in waxed paper from the basket, placing them on the cloth.” He 
continues, “There were boiled eggs wrapped in twists of paper like favors for a 
children’s party; and tomatoes, and a chocolate cake and a thermos of iced tea with 
mint leaves and lemon slices floating in it” (268-9).6 This is a significant shift within 
Sunraider’s retrospective, megalographic rendering of his rise from Bliss-ful 
ignorance to U.S. Senator. It is also a pivotal moment for this character, who is no 
longer Bliss, but is not yet Sunraider; who is about to cast the die that will lead to his 
downfall, but has not yet acted on his impulses. It is a pause—a still shot within the 
movie of his mind—that temporarily shatters the megalographic illusion with 
rhopographic imagery, and thereby reveals the degree to which the rhopographic and 
the megalographic are, as Norman Bryson observes, “intertwined” (61). Sunraider’s 
self-creation as a megalographic subject inside of historical time is revealed to be the 
antithesis of, as well as differentially defined by, a rhopographic moment that belies 
the constructed illusion of this temporal construction. 
Things don’t stay still for very long, however, and soon “Mr. Movie-man,” 
along with his associates Donelson and Karp, is hustling the African American 
citizens of Lavatrice’s Oklahoma hometown as a flim-flam filmmaker. As he recalls 
these days from his hospital bed, Sunraider describes Donelson’s disjointed film 
sequences, which he repudiates as “nothing more than a jumble of scenes, as though 
the rambling impressions of an idiot’s day had been photographed” (279). What 
follows is a long meditation on temporality and the simulated motion of cinematic 
images:  
With Donelson it was gelly, gelly, gelatine—all day long and all images ran 
to chaos, as though Sherman’s Army had traumatized his sense of order 
forever. Once there was a sequence of a man whitewashing the walls of the 
slaughterhouse which stood at the edge of town near the river, and this 
followed by a flock of birds strung out skimming over a stretch of field; 
then came shots of the courthouse clock at those moments when the 
enormous hands leaped across the gaps of time to take new positions but 
ever the same on the bird-fouled face, then a reversed flight of birds, and 
this followed by the clock hands whirling in swift reversal. (279)  
Sunraider complains that Donelson shot these sequences simply for “the joy of 
denying the reality of all that which he turned his lenses upon” (280), and proclaims 
that whereas “Donelson ached to reverse time, I yearned to master it, or so I told 
myself” (279). The irony of these observations is that the future Senator’s filmic 
creations are equally atemporal, as are his recollections of the past itself, hence the 
convoluted shape of his narrative in Book II. Rather than master time, the man who 
would become Sunraider insures that he will become the tragic subject of the same 
historico-temporal construct that McIntyre unconsciously reproduces. 
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The atemporality of “Mr. Movie-man’s” motion pictures is explored in Ellison’s 
computer sequence “Hickman in Georgia & Oklahoma,” material which most likely 
would have eventually become Book III of the novel, where a Choctaw man named 
Love New describes with disdain the filmmakers’ practices, especially those of the 
man he refers to as the “black-white one” (i.e., Bliss/Sunraider). Love New describes 
for Hickman, Bliss’s foster father, how the man once known as Bliss spliced 
together bits of film for the black community to view. As Love New’s comments 
illustrate, the future Congressman’s creations are no better at Donelson’s at creating 
narrative coherence or mastering time. If anything, they accomplish the opposite, 
disarticulating images of African Americans from dynamic constructions of 
temporality and the narratives that underwrite them. This becomes clear when Bliss, 
whom Love New calls “Prophet” after the sermon he spontaneously preached in 
town, decides to “r[u]n off some of the reels he and his crew hadn’t yet edited” for 
the townspeople he’d just been exploiting (794). Love New describes the resulting 
experience of “watching folks watching themselves floating down streets in a 
dream-like slow motion, then streaking around houses and buildings like hounds 
with cans tied to their tails” (794). Rather than contribute to any duration-simulating 
narrative, the townspeople are shown instead “inflated into images as wide as the 
Courthouse or Capitol, then walking forwards, running backwards, and dancing in 
circles. First in slow motion and again at the speed of a whirlwind” (794). 
Aside from echoing Donelson’s “chaotic” films, Sunraider’s atemporal vision, 
which irrupts into his own quasi-cinematic recollection of events, anticipates Todd 
McGowan’s recent observations about atemporal cinema. Suggesting that Freud’s 
notion of the death drive rather than the pleasure principle (desire) enables a new 
psychoanalytic reading of the cinema, McGowan argues that cinematic time contains 
a gap “in which an absence repeats itself, and this repetition corresponds to that of 
the death drive”—a repetition accentuated by filmmakers through the editing process 
and duplicated through the projection of the completed film (xi). Such films 
“introduce spectators to an alternative way of experiencing existence in time—or, 
more exactly, a way of experiencing existence outside of our usual conception of 
time.” “Time in these films doesn’t bring about a different future but instead an 
incessant repetition,” argues McGowan—a repetition that reveals “the circular logic 
of what psychoanalysis calls the drive, in which narrative is oriented around a 
foundational moment of traumatic loss” (9-10). 
The traumatic loss that gets repeated again and again in Book II is the second of 
the two moments introduced above, namely Bliss’s perpetually deferred entry into 
white subjectivity following his interpellation as the (possible) son of the white 
woman who briefly takes possession of him at the Juneteenth camp meeting. The 
following analysis not only explains this loss, but also illustrates why Sunraider’s 
cinematic recollections of it take atemporal form. Of particular importance in the 
following paragraphs are the extended analogies Ellison draws between still 
photography and/or sequential photograms (film qua film), the body, atemporality, 
objectivity, and blackness on the one hand, and moving pictures, the spirit, narrative, 
subjectivity, and whiteness on the other. 
The labyrinthine and atemporal presentation of Sunraider’s recollection from 
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his hospital bed of the loss that still traumatizes him begins with an extended 
sequence in which “Daddy” Hickman takes young Bliss to see a movie. In the 
middle of this reverie, Sunraider recalls his younger self, Bliss, learning about 
Sammy Leatherman’s movie projector. Describing the apparatus to the incredulous 
Bliss, a boy nicknamed Body states that the people “in the machine” are “like a gang 
of ghosts, man” (288). Body proceeds to observe that there are no black people in 
these films—the “ghosts” about which he speaks are all apparitions of white 
actors—a fact that later informs Bliss/Sunraider’s attempts to turn his black subjects 
into “ghosts” by shooting them with his cine camera in a way that denies them any 
coherent temporal and/or narrative context. Interestingly, the movie that Bliss and 
Hickman watch together is clearly narrative-driven—a linear, historical romance that 
hints at the megalographic imperatives of such texts, and the antithesis of the 
atemporal “chaos” of Donelson’s sequences (279). This long, layered memory ends 
with the recollection of Bliss convincing himself that the actress he sees on the 
screen is the mother he never knew—a mother he thought was dead, “A ghost…” 
(339)—who earlier (temporally speaking) interrupted his staged resurrection as the 
Holy Spirit during Hickman’s sermon at the camp meeting. 
There’s an undeniable parallel between Bliss’s recollection of himself trapped 
in the white coffin from which he theatrically rises during the sermons he preaches 
with Hickman—a light-tight box inside of which everything pink or white turns 
black—and the motion picture camera he later turns onto others (331). However, this 
can also be read as a meditation on the technologies through which Bliss expresses 
his dilemma. Inside the box, like the negatives inside Hickman’s Kodak, he is still 
and black (read: he’s still black); but motion, narrative, and cinematic projection are 
all associated with whiteness. Hence Sunraider’s representation of himself in the 
opening sequence of Book II as the projected white subject of a narrative film of his 
own creation. Lights, camera, and action enable him to deny—or rather defer—his 
blackness, but it continually returns in the form of still images that irrupt into the 
projected apparition. When the white woman ejects (or projects) Bliss from the box, 
she brings him simultaneously into motion and into whiteness, however fleetingly. 
Immediately after identifying his would-be mother as “A ghost,” he recalls “Then he 
was looking at the familiar faces, seeing their bodies frozen in odd postures like 
Body and the others when they played a game of statue” (339). As Body remarked 
earlier, “ghost” is another name for the projected apparition, which is equated in both 
instances with the white body; the stilled figures, by contrast, are the black bodies 
from which he now distinguishes himself/against which he defines himself. 
Extending the flesh/spirit metaphor articulated above, Mrs. Proctor, one of the 
parishioners, ironically likens the attempt to snatch Bliss from the box to an attempt 
“to interrupt the Resurrection of the spirit from the flesh!” (360). 
All of the pieces introduced above converge in the Senator’s recollection of his 
younger self, Bliss, being led away from the camp meeting after it is broken up by 
the white woman claiming to be his mother. Observe how the cinematic 
representation of Bliss’s subsequent flight in the arms of Sister Georgia briefly 
freezes into a still image in the following passage:  
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He had been in the coffin, ready to rise up and all of a sudden there she 
was, screaming. Now it was like a picture he was looking at in a book or in 
a dream—even as he watched the tear-sparkling tent falling rapidly away. 
And in the up and down swaying of the sister’s movement he could no 
longer tell one member from another; he couldn’t even see Daddy 
Hickman. She was really one of them, passed through his mind, then the 
road was dipping swiftly down a hill in the dark and he was being taken 
where he could no longer see the peak shape of the tent rising white above 
the yellow light. (367) 
Bliss is trapped between blackness and whiteness; between the still image and the 
motion picture; stasis and movement, his liminal status symbolically duplicated by 
his position between the would-be white mother he left behind and Sister Georgia’s 
house in the woods to which he has not yet arrived. In the description above, his 
movement away from the white tent and the white woman freezes into a still 
image—a picture from a book or a dream—and he conflates his white would-be 
mother with the black women who helped raise him, hence his thought, “She was 
really one of them.” He denies the whiteness of the woman who tries to claim him by 
freezing her image photographically, while simultaneously cloaking her racial 
difference under a cover of gender affinity. The temporary inversion of the 
established link between racial identity and ekphrastic imagery continues as Bliss 
thinks, “We are like ghosts on this road” as he reflects upon his white suit and Sister 
Georgia’s white dress (368). This inversion, like his symbolic collapsing of 
whiteness into blackness above, is a symptom of Bliss’s now-vexed racial identity.  
Extending the symbolism of this confusion, Bliss’s flight is punctuated by 
another still life containing photographic portraits. After Sister Georgia set him down 
and hugged him, recalls the dying Senator, he saw “beyond her head two tinted 
pictures of old folks frozen in attitudes of dreamy and remote dignity looked down 
from where they hung high on the wall in oval frames, seeming to float behind 
curved glass,” within which “he could see the reflection of his shadowed face 
showing above her bending shoulders and against the side of her darkened head” 
(369). 
Here, it seems that Bliss is identifying himself with the portraits, the reflections 
of which contain his own image—his own “shadowed face.” At this point, he seems 
to have chosen blackness/stillness over whiteness/motion, but we already know that 
he will eventually decide otherwise. In this way, Bliss’s experience of confronting 
still images of his own would-be black ancestors serves as a bookend for McIntyre’s 
experience at Laura’s parents’ home in Book I. 
Bliss/Sunraider’s transition from black to white and thus from the still image to 
the motion picture takes symbolic form within the Senator’s memory as he recalls 
chasing down a moving streetcar attached to which is a photograph of the actress he 
mistook earlier for his mother (387). This moving picture, literally, leads him to the 
motion picture it advertises when the streetcar stops in front of the movie theatre at 
which the film is playing—a film he watches for the second time, reliving the 
traumatic memory of his aborted entry into and simultaneous ejection from a white 
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identity she represents. From this memory of loss (or lack), the Senator transitions 
immediately into a recollection of his filmmaking days/practices, which coincide 
with his passing for white. But there is always some residue, some “mystery” that 
follows him, as he says, and the white identity he pursues is, like the black identity 
from which he tries to escape, perpetually deferred: 
…It was all a matter of time; just a little time. I shall think too of the 
camera and the swath it cut through the country of my travels, and how 
after the agony I had merely stepped into a different dimension of time. 
Between the frames in blackness I left and in time discovered that it was no 
mere matter of place which made the difference, but time. And not 
chronology either, only time. Because I was no older and although I 
discovered early that in different places I became a different me….  
 And later whenever instead of taking in a scene the camera 
seemed to focus forth my own point of view I felt murderous, felt that 
justifiable murder was being committed and my images a blasting of the 
world. I felt sometimes that a duplicity was being commissioned, an 
ambuscade trained upon those who thought they knew themselves and me. 
And yet I felt that I was myself a dupe because there was always the 
question aroused by my ability to see into events and the awareness of the 
joke implicit in being me. (393) 
In an attempt to identify as white instead of black, Bliss metaphorically moves 
from the blackness of the spaces between the still photograms into the (simulated) 
motion of the sequential frames (note that passing, here, which Ellison explicitly 
equates with “self-denial” (Ralph Ellison Papers I:140, folder 6), is equated with a 
strip of film passing through a movie projector, hence Bliss’s self-reflexive reference 
to himself as a photogrammatic “dupe”). Yet it is the very black subjects he attempts 
to differentially define himself against via his “murderous” camera work that blast 
his satisfaction by reminding him of his status as the butt of the same racial “joke.” 
The simulated motion of the cinema may subsume and render invisible the spaces 
between the sequential still images on the film strip, but the strip of film, its 
photograms, and now the black gaps that separate them, continually shimmer to the 
surface, always reminding Bliss/Sunraider of that which cannot be suppressed: the 
heritage he shares with “Daddy” Hickman, likened here to a filmic presence that 
irrupts into the cinematic illusion. As Ellison remarked in his working notes, “Bliss 
is fascinated by moments of blackness between cinematic frames, and his life is 
hidden here much as his activities before becoming a politician are hidden. ‘Look for 
me between the frames, in the dark…’” (Ralph Ellison Papers I:139, folder 4).7 
To return, then, to the assassination attempt that initiates both books of the 
novel, Sunraider’s attempt to avoid the “freeze frame” of death is simultaneously a 
simulated attempt to defer his blackness, equated throughout the novel with the still 
photograph, which stands in for death itself. To be photographed, as Barthes knew, is 
to be marked for death. But to Adam Sunraider, to return to blackness is to fade to 
black. Keeping the camera rolling means keeping the movie going, and keeping the 
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projector running means maintaining his white image. The disintegration of this 
image into its constituent “shots,” represented by the bullets that rain down upon him 
from his black son’s murderous gun, is the return of the repressed in more ways than 
one. 
While McIntyre’s photographic vision most obviously connects photography, 
racialism, and coercive linear temporality to one another, Sunraider’s failed attempt 
to use motion pictures to destroy time, or “master it” as he phrases it, shows the 
degree to which his efforts to construct a Deleuze-Guattarian “body without organs” 
and thereby slip the yoke of the habitual patterns of lived actualities are foreclosed 
(279). As Tamsin Lorraine points out, constructing a “body without organs” is a 
process fundamentally about time and representation. Thought-forms like art and 
literature, she writes, can be used to create “plateaus of intensity where something 
new could happen” by interrupting ingrained patterns of thought and behavior so 
that virtualities immanent to the present hitherto relegated to “the lower frequencies” 
can become actualized (98). Tuning in to the virtual coiled within the actual, notes 
Lorraine, often means “resonating the dynamic flow of time with cultural 
representations of the already actualized real in a way that can bring new 
possibilities to the fore. Such possibilities have always been there,” she writes, “but 
were excluded by forms of thought and perception that spatialize time and 
emphasize representable forms of the past at the expense of dynamic tendencies 
implicit in the present that in tandem with the actual propel reality forward” (98-99).  
The rhopographic still life, as Bryson describes it, meets the criteria of a 
thought-form that, while depicting an actualized reality in which nothing is 
happening, creates a plateau of intensity “where something new could happen,” in 
no small part by resisting the spatialization of time. This resistance inheres in 
rhopography’s refusal to privilege the human subject over the portrayed object and, 
just as importantly, the medium’s ability to formalize immanent time. Whereas 
megalography affirms the transcendent (read: spatialized, static) time of history, 
rhopography promotes recognition of the multiplicity of temporalities constitutive of 
each moment. Rhopographic images are not “outside” of time; rather, they reveal 
that time has no “outside” or “inside.” In lieu of any social or historical context there 
exists only the durational difference between viewing subject and represented object, 
a difference that continuously unfolds in irreversible time. Because rhopographic 
images do not objectify subjects so much as portray objects in ways that “induce 
intensities” immanent to the present (Grosz 159), rhopography, I argue, is the visual 
logic of duration. 
Sunraider’s modal shift from rhopography to megalography, then, inscribes a 
temporal transition from immanence to transcendence, from dynamic to static, and 
thus also from becoming to being. Not surprisingly, as he makes this transition the 
habitual patterns of a racist society reterritorialize themselves through his thoughts, 
his actions, and their effects. Rather than revel in the creativity of irreversible time or 
duration as it first presents itself to him, the man who would become Senator 
Sunraider works first to obliterate time as a cinematographer before plunging into 
the static temporality of history as a U.S. Congressman. To become an historical 
subject of Sunraider’s stature during the early 1950s, the temporal setting of the 
20 IJCS 
novel, one had to affirm the status quo of racial segregation. Part and parcel of this 
affirmation was the visualization of black people as static objects against which the 
progress of history’s white subjects was measured and through which it was 
enacted—a necessity the Senator is only too willing to oblige, and which, as Russ 
Castronovo notes, “American democratic culture was adept at reproducing” (152). 
However, Ellison flips the script in Book II of Three Days by portraying the white 
subjects like Senator Sunraider “inside” of historical time as figures equally as tragic 
as the minoritarian subjects excised from history or entombed within it. 
The parallel Ellison draws between Sunraider’s plunge from duration into the 
static time of history and his reinforcement of a nationally inflected racist ideology is 
informed by Ellison’s reading and annotation of Northrup Frye’s 1967 Fools of 
Time: Studies in Shakespearean Tragedy, one of the most heavily annotated books in 
Ellison’s personal library. In this collection of lectures, Frye compares what he calls 
the “order-figure,” who “experiences time as the rhythm of his actions,” to the 
“tragic rebel,” who “has committed himself primarily to fortune, and in fortune what 
happens depends on resolution, decision, and will, instead of a on a natural course of 
events to be followed” (89; Ellison’s emphasis). What makes the rebel-figure 
“tragic,” writes Frye, is that his planned rebellion is not unlike a fall from durational 
grace. “[A]s soon as the rebel-figure plans his rebellion,” he writes, “he has a sense 
of having broken through the continuity of time. He no longer has any sense of the 
present moment: he is conscious only of the ‘gap of time’ that Leontes [from The 
Winter’s Tale] falls into when he becomes jealous” (89; Ellison’s emphasis). In the 
margin next to this underlined passage, Ellison has written, “Bliss.” Bliss, like the 
tragic rebel described by Frye, subjectively plunges out of time’s continuity or 
duration when he adopts the persona of a racist policymaker “inside” the “groove of 
history” while keeping his identity hidden in the illusory “spaces” between the 
sequential moments of static, spatialized time. 
Ellison’s Polaroid Photographs: Beyond Ontography 
When McIntyre bursts through the door of the recently deceased Jessie 
Rockmore’s house in Book I, he lunges headlong into “a blaze of light and brilliant 
color” to find himself surrounded by objects in “a ragtag museum” (139). 
Rockmore, part salvage man, part curator, obtained the lithographs, books, fine 
china, musical instruments, furniture, and various objets d’art from old homes that 
were being torn down, often passing for white in order to obtain the belongings from 
their well-to-do possessors. But to McIntyre, these “vague objects and artifacts 
appeared to have been wrenched from their place, time, and function” (140). 
Especially confounding to the reporter is the proximity of Rockmore’s collection to 
the U.S. Capitol, “the center of our national source of order” (140). McIntyre sees 
the assemblage of objects as “calculated chaos,” but assures himself that “it was 
their chaos, the Negroes and the police, not mine” (141). But when the images 
around him spring to life and he feels his own conscience being pricked by the 
vitality of inanimate objects, McIntyre asks, “How did one begin to think about such 
a place with its collection of things?” (144).  
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Fig. 1. Four fishes, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the Library of 
Congress. 
Just like in Chapter Thirteen of Invisible Man when the novel’s unnamed 
protagonist stumbles upon the belongings of an elderly couple being evicted from 
their Harlem home, McIntyre’s feeling of being confronted by a “collection of 
things” reveals the degree to which he is unable to process the temporal chaos that 
lives within the pattern of his historical certainties. To McIntyre, the heterogeneous 
durations and virtual temporalities represented by the objects in Rockmore’s home 
violate his sense of majoritarian order and the history that underwrites it, hence his 
unconscious association of government power with whiteness and temporal order. 
What eludes McIntyre’s conscious thought should not escape ours, however: 
McIntyre’s dedication to identity—in this case national identity and the whiteness 
with which it is equated—obscures the difference that lurks behind every identity. 
Rockmore’s “museum” is where this difference proliferates. 
 
Fig. 2. Abstract, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the Library of 
Congress. 
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Reviewing Ralph Ellison’s Polaroid archive can make one feel, at first, like 
McIntyre plunging into Rockmore’s parlor, for what one encounters is a collection 
consisting of hundreds of images of things. Of the 1261 Polaroid photographs in the 
Ralph Ellison collection housed in the Prints and Photographs Division of the 
Library of Congress, all of which were taken between 1966 and Ellison’s death in 
1994, fewer than 150 depict human subjects. The dearth of people in Ellison’s 
Polaroid compositions becomes more glaring when one considers that nearly half of 
the peopled Polaroids—71 to be exact—are of Ellison during those rare occasions 
when the camera was handed over to his wife Fanny (or rent from his hands) to 
document family gatherings, functions in which Ellison participated, etc. The rest 
were taken by Ellison himself. Unlike his early work in portraiture and street 
photography in which human subjects dominate, these Polaroids predominantly 
feature still life and abstract compositions, with occasional unpeopled landscapes 
and snapshots of inanimate objects (see Figs. 1-3). And then there’s the fact that the 
more than eleven hundred object-oriented Polaroid photographs Ellison produced 
are, from a photo-materialist standpoint, things in and of themselves. How does one 
begin to think about such a collection of things? 
 
Fig. 3. Charlottesville, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the Library 
of Congress. 
Complicating the viewer’s efforts to interpret this archive is the fact that instant 
pictures of inanimate objects don’t really fit the mold of the types of photographs 
typically analyzed by photography’s dominant theorists. They are nothing like the 
image of Barthes’s deceased mother that launches his ontological reverie in Camera 
Lucida. Nor are they “appropriative” in the sense used by Susan Sontag in On 
Photography (4). They aren’t the kinds objects destined for exchange described by 
Elizabeth Edwards or the sort of “attraction” described by Peter Buse. Perhaps the 
Polaroid is, as Buse suggests (with tongue firmly planted in cheek), too banal to take 
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seriously, never mind the Polaroid still life. Yet no one can account for the very 
things I find curious about Ellison’s photographs. Why, I ask, would an 
accomplished photographer like Ellison, who was well versed in medium format and 
35mm apparatuses, use Polaroid Land cameras to shoot still life photographs? Why, 
for that matter, would anyone prefer this medium for this genre? 
These inquiries about the Polaroid image inhere within a broader question about 
photography and materiality: does the photograph dematerialize its subject (even if 
that subject is an object), or does it double that materiality in the form of the 
photograph itself? In “Photographs as Objects of Memory,” Elizabeth Edwards 
claims “that the relationship between photograph and memory and the way in which 
it obtains its privileged position as a conduit of memory is refracted through the 
photograph’s materiality” (331). Extending this observation, I would suggest that the 
Polaroid amplifies (or distils) this relationship, calling attention to the materiality of 
the photograph in ways specific to the process. After all, the developing chemicals of 
post-1972 SX-70 Polaroids are sandwiched within the prints. If, as Barthes notes, the 
image and the object are “laminated” together in the photograph (6), then the 
Polaroid photograph literally contains, between these two layers, the very agent of 
this merger. The instantaneousness of the Polaroid is therefore inseparable from its 
materiality, which it doubles. 
The surplus materiality of the Polaroid photograph, integral to the medium 
itself, is also integral to my reading of the Polaroid still life in general and Ralph 
Ellison’s rhopographic Polaroids in particular. Specifically, the materiality of the 
photograph, doubled by the Polaroid and tripled by the Polaroid still life, is 
inseparable from rhopography’s troubling of time and its relationship to narrative. 
Norman Bryson argues that still life composition is antithetical to narrative by 
observing that narratives are for subjects, not objects. The still life, he writes, is “the 
genre at the furthest remove from narrative” (9) as it “assaults the centrality, value 
and prestige of the human subject” (60).8 If photography “thingifies” the subject, 
then photographs of things can be visual quotations of photography’s objectifying 
potential. And if, as I have argued, the Polaroid process itself creates a surfeit of 
materiality, then this objectification is doubly quoted by each Polaroid still life.  
When taken out of the context of a discussion of photography’s role in Three 
Days, Ellison’s Polaroids appear to conform to Ian Bogost’s definition of 
“photographic ontography,” or the photography of being that “involves the 
revelation of object relationships without necessarily offering clarification or 
description of any kind” (38). Yet Ellison’s exposé of photography’s role in reifying 
molar constructions of racial being as opposed to molecular processes of becoming-
other (McIntyre fails at becoming-black; Sunraider fails to see how being white is 
just an emergent, molar form of a molecular becoming-white) suggests that Ellison’s 
turn to object-oriented photography is part of a broader exploration of becoming vis 
à vis being; a remedy for rather than an accessory to the objectifying and spatializing 
gaze of his characters, engraved by the media through which their views of the world 
are reproduced. 
If, as I suggested earlier, Ellison’s portrayals of amassed objects in his fiction 
challenge his characters’ linear/progressive views of time and history, then we 
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should read Ellison’s collection of object-oriented Polaroids as a declaration of the 
multiplicity of temporalities inherent in duration. To Ellison, objects, not just 
subjects, are alive with vitality—a Bergsonian notion adopted by Deleuze that 
subtends posthumanism and object-oriented ontology alike. This vitality, which 
confounds both the Invisible Man and McIntyre, is inseparable from the 
heterogeneity of time and the process of becoming. In short, Ellison’s proto-
posthumanist Polaroids are the photographic equivalents of the elderly couple’s 
belongings heaped on the curb in Invisible Man and the artifacts assembled at Jessie 
Rockmore’s in Three Days. They force the viewer to abandon the temporality that 
subtends progressive history and experience instead the intensities of durational 
difference that emerge between him- or herself and the viewed objects—a difference 
that multiplies with each image and unfolds in irreversible time. They also 
collectively articulate an antidote to what Laura Wexler describes as “the 
subject/object dichotomies produced by a white power of looking” reinscribed by 
both McIntyre and Sunraider in Three Days (90). 
 
Fig. 4. Dead woodpecker, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress.  
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Fig. 5. Photo-montage, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the Library 
of Congress. 
One can see in Ellison’s Polaroid photographs these theoretical concepts at 
work. A burlesque of the nature photography genre, an image of a dead woodpecker 
[Fig. 4] both self-reflexively dramatizes the “mortifying” gaze of the camera and 
equates the Polaroid object of the dead bird with the dead bird itself, all the while 
reminding the viewer that the literal translation of “still life” in many languages is 
“dead nature.” Such collapsing of photographic subject and photo-object continues 
in Ellison’s photo-montage, which contains images of Fanny that have been 
clipped—decontextualized—from larger photographs that once contained them [Fig. 
5]. Here, the human subject is not only rendered as an object, but also put into 
another context. Literally served upon a plate in a flattened composition, the subject 
of these images become an object objectively objectified; a meta-commentary not 
only on photo-materiality, but also on photography and death. 
 
Fig. 6. Flower arrangement #1, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress.  
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Fig. 7. Flower arrangement #2, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress.  
 
Fig. 8. Still life, Polaroid photograph from Ralph Ellison Collection, Courtesy of the Library of 
Congress. 
If the aforementioned images dramatize the perils of turning subjects into 
objects—perils realized by McIntyre in Book I of Three Days—then Ellison’s still 
life and abstract Polaroid photographs represent antidotes to the mortifying gaze of 
the camera lens. The countless flower arrangements in the collection, for which Figs. 
6 and 7 stand in, as well as images of prepared meals like the one shown in Fig. 8, 
are the purest forms of rhopography. One can see in these images analogues of “Mr. 
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Movie-man’s” experience of time suspended as he gazes upon the picnic prepared 
for him by Lavatrice—a moment that, as he recalls it from memory, prompts him to 
“Leave the moment unbroken in its becoming” (267). Compare this Bergsonian self-
admonition to his younger self of the same moment, who tells Lavatrice that the spot 
they’ve picked for their picnic is “Just the place for a time like this” (267), a 
conflation of space and time antithetical to Bergsonianism. The suspension of time 
unbroken, integral to rhopography, is, as Sunraider’s deathbed realization suggests, 
the antidote to the spatialization of time (while lapsing into a coma and perhaps into 
death, one of Sunraider’s final doubting thoughts is, “Was time only space?” (393)). 
And if, as I have argued, the reterritorialization of asymmetrical power relations and 
racial formations inheres in time configured as extended space, then Ellison’s 
hundreds of object-oriented Polaroids could be viewed as points of departure in lines 
of flight from such assemblages of power and resistance, intensifying the 
multiplicity of temporal virtualitites overwritten by the “groove of history” and the 
notion of static time that subtends it. 
  
                                                 
Notes 
This essay is excerpted from a book manuscript-in-progress that examines how 
Ellison’s investigations of and preoccupations with photography, panoramas, 
cinematography, and music theory—what I call technologies of temporality—are 
inseparable from his ongoing efforts to trouble entrenched constructions of linear 
time. Neither the book manuscript nor this essay would have been possible without 
the assistance and guidance of Maricia Battle and Eric Frazier at the Library of 
Congress, who led me through the worlds of Ellison’s photographs and books, 
respectively. I am also grateful for the encouragement of my cohorts in the Ralph 
Ellison Society—especially Adam Bradley, John F. Callahan, Marc C. Conner, Lena 
Hill, Michael Hill, Lucas Morel, Alan Nadel, and Timothy Parrish—whose 
contributions to Ellison studies have inspired and informed my own. 
1  “Rhopography,” according to Norman Bryson (following Charles Sterling), is 
derived from the Latin word for “trivial objects, small wares, trifles”: rhopos (61). 
2 In The Nick of Time, Elizabeth Grosz summarizes Bergson thusly: “The future is 
that over which the past and present have no control: the future is that openness of 
becoming that enables divergence from what exists. This means that, rather than the 
past’s exerting a deterministic force over the future, the future is that which 
overwrites or restructures the virtual that is the past: the past is the condition of every 
future; the future that emerges is only one of the lines of virtuality from the past. The 
past is the condition for infinite futures, and duration is that flow that connects the 
future to the past that gave it impetus” (184). 
Inasmuch as my exploration of Ellison’s use of ekphrasis as a means to navigate 
and negotiate minoritarian subjectivity is concerned, I am preceded in this approach 
by Lena Hill, whose excellent essay “The Visual Art of Invisible Man: Ellison’s 
Portrait of Blackness” examines how Ellison turns to and in the process reclaims 
visual forms while documenting his characters’ attempts to “escape a legacy of 
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visual derogation” they reify (791). Hill’s demonstration of Ellison’s use of 
ekphrasis to articulate social critiques tied to scopic regimes demonstrates the 
richness and future potential of this approach. 
3 This is the “anterior future” of the photograph that so horrifies Roland Barthes in 
Camera Lucida: “By giving me the absolute past of the pose (aorist),” writes 
Barthes, “the photograph tells me death in the future. What pricks me is the 
discovery of this equivalence” (96). 
4 McIntyre remains preoccupied by still images throughout Book I, which becomes 
clear at the opening chapter’s end where McIntyre measures his failure to stop the 
assassin against his lack of success as a journalist—a lack that is itself measured by 
the disappointing fact that he “possess[es] not one solitary autographed 
photograph—those emblems of a certain journalistic success—from a president, 
cabinet member, or leader of Congress” (16). 
5 A similar gesture occurs in Chapter 10 as the memory McIntyre continues to recall 
pauses a moment on “[a] photograph collection of black prizefighters in pugilistic 
poses” hung on a the wall of a bar in Harlem (113). Like in Laura’s family’s 
apartment, McIntyre retreats from the anxieties caused by black presence by 
escaping into still photographs. Clearly, McIntyre’s shortcomings as a narrator are 
indicative not only of his failures as a novelist, but his failures as a person who 
claims to be liberal minded and anti-racist. 
6 Observe how, in this description, Sunraider describes his head resting upon his 
knees like a camera resting upon the legs of a tripod. 
7 Extending the dual analogy Ellison draws between blackness and still photography 
on the one hand and whiteness and motion picture projection on the other are the two 
coffins/boxes in the two books of the novel: one into which Rockmore, a black man, 
enters but never leaves, having been reduced to a frozen “stiff,” and another from 
which Bliss continually arises as a (holy) spirit after entering as flesh and blood. If 
each box/coffin stands in for a photographic/cinematic apparatus, and I think Ellison 
gives us enough hints to encourage such a reading, then we have in these juxtaposed 
scenes two echoes of the theme already established: the stilling of African 
Americans via photography and/or the gaze it reproduces, and the simulated deferral 
of blackness via cinematic projection.  
8 Peter Schwenger challenges this concept by noting that “[a] certain stream of 
twentieth-century writing…deals with the ways we read objects” (142). Whereas for 
Bryson the still life is characterized by a “wholesale eviction of the Event” integral 
to narrative (Looking 61), Schwenger argues that for many modern authors the 
“Event” is not necessarily the hub upon which narrative must turn, and he illustrates 
this point with more object-centered narratives like Nicholson Baker’s novel The 
Mezzanine. 
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